Essay📖 从还原论/整体论的对立到矛盾论的统一 (From the opposition between reductionism and holism to the unity of contradiction)

还原论描绘了这样的内容，即一切物质都可以分解为一个个独立的，互不相同的基本单元。从这些基本单元出发，我们可以建立起整个世界。整体论则不然，它认为，物质本身不可分割，必须以整体的形式考虑。这两种认识世界的观点是古老的。然而，他们在最近100年左右的时间里，才真正系统的作为两种对立的阵营登上历史舞台。

最近一段时间，科学界对于还原论的批判是较多的。翻开几篇科学文章，特别是头等期刊的文章就能发现这样的端倪。

起初在没有较多思考时，当时的我看来，这似乎反映对于物质世界的理解已经到达了一个瓶颈。当代科学的研究深度和广度远超过去300年的总和。当代科学的参与者也超过了过去的总和。如果从库恩的“范式转移”来说，似乎科学已经到了一个需要颠覆式变革的时代。

我的本科所经历的科学训练，告诉我“结构决定性质”，要探究和分析表观层面的问题，必须向下求索，深入到分子或者原子的层次，只有这样才能理解物质本身。然而在过去6-7年的时间里，我所参与的科学研究过程反而是一个相反的路径。我所做的更多的时候是通过爱迪生式的过程，大量实验去找到最优结果，再反过来去组合出一个自洽的，微观层级理论。理论的思考方式与现实的实现路径出现了偏差，甚至是因果颠倒的。我们不得不为一个又一个的案例设置一个又一个特例。理论的复杂度同时在不断的爆炸。这些特例和复杂的理论又使得学科之间的分裂成为了必然。我们的工作越多，分析的越多，理论越复杂，看起来距离真理越近，反而实际上却距离越来越远了。我想在当代的研究者中，几乎每个人都在面临着这样的问题。很大程度上，因为这种偏差的存在，研究者的工作变成了一种梦幻科学故事的写作者。而非物质，真理本身在说话。

那么似乎我们应该追求整体论的认识方式？

经历了最初的认识，我确实是这样理解的。但现实却是脱离了还原论，物质就变得无法研究了。尽管在很多研究中强调他们从整体论的角度思考问题，但实际情况却是他们所论述的仍然是旧的范式。在整体论的假设中，如果物质不可分割，必须以整体的形式考虑，那么我们要考虑的参数维度会大幅膨胀。如果细胞只能在人的身体中才能被理解，而人又在宇宙之中。那么这种理论的结果就变成了，我们必须理解整个宇宙才能理解某个具体的事物。而如果我们模糊掉了整体的部分性质，注重于部分单元，这又变成了在宏观尺度上的还原论。

越来越多的思考告诉我，这是另一个不可能世界。整体论和还原论的所要追求的最终结果是同样的，那就是人成为上帝，再造世界。而这绝无可能。人和科学是无法实现这样的目标。

我们必须对还原论和整体论有更多的更基本的认识。

如果说还原论强调物质可以被分解为一个个独立的，互不相同的基本单元。那么，在我们的世界中存在这样独立的，不与其他部分相互依赖的基本单元吗？我想任何一个人都可以斩钉截铁的回答，不存在！那么，独立基本单元是如何而来的？以氢键，这个对物质世界有着关键作用的作用力为例。尽管氢键的研究已经持续了100多年的时间，每个学者在研究不同案例时都对氢键提出了自己的定义。直到2011年，国际纯粹与应用化学联合会（International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, IUPAC)才给出一个相对完整的氢键定义。而在具体的研究中，我们一般认为，作用力范围在2.3-3.5埃米距离内，夹角接近直角的被视为氢键。在更具体的研究中会更模糊一些，我们会把尺度放宽的更大。

从氢键的故事，我们可以得出一个关于确定独立基本单元的历程。首先，某个学者注意到了某个组成“单元”。在氢键的研究过程中，是鲍林扮演了这一角色。随后，在一个很长时间段里，许许多多学者在诸多不同具体问题上尝试去论述这个“单元”。当研究足够多，时间足够长，探究了足够多不同问题时，整个科学界才得以达成部分共识，对这一论述提出一个定义。我们可以发现，在这样的独立基本单元的确立过程中，就隐藏着整体论的影子。只有探究到了足够多的案例，水中的氢键，水在不同状态中的氢键，不同蛋白质中的氢键，等等。我们才能定义一个标准基本“单元”！从这个角度看，还原论所认识的基本单元，本质上是我们对相似现象的大量观察，忽略掉极端案例的宏观统计结果。更深入一些，它是我们对我们所观察到现象的抽象。

而整体论呢？整体论强调物质本身不可被分割，不能被分割为基本单元，只能作为物质本身才能被理解。它所论说的在于，我们所观察到的物质本身存在他们自己所有的独特特征，这种特征是无法通过分割的研究方法所确定。它的意义在于，我们所研究的物质本身有物质本身独特的存在，这种存在不能被人所观察到的现象理解，即事物有独立于观察的内在本质。

那这个问题的核心就变成了，我们所抽象的现象和物质本身的对立。到这里我们就太高兴了。因为在过去的历史长河中，有这样一位来自柯尼斯堡的哲学家（康德）就做过这样的事情。康德将世界分为“现象界”和“物自体”。他提出人只能认识现象，物质本身有自己的规律。而现象界和物自体本质上是对立的，不能放在同一个层次上思考，这两者之间的矛盾不可调和，必须将二者分割开。这样的分割使得康德哲学遇到了“二律背反”难题，即同一个对象或问题所形成的两种理论或学说虽然各自成立，但是却相互矛盾。这一难题，正是还原论和整体论面临的最核心问题。从这里判断，还原论和整体论的矛盾必然永恒存在，决然不能统一。这种对立的核心不仅仅是认识论的对立，它来源于康德哲学的“现象界”和“物自体”之间的对立。

如果我们确认了还原论和整体论的对立，我们能否就此停止争论，像康德一样忽视它，在它们该存在的范围内讨论它们？

答案显然是不可能。如果科学是追求真理的科学，如果试图解决某个问题上的“真理”只能在一个角度里说话，对另一个角度描述的全然不能解释。那这个“真理”是“真理”吗？二者的根本冲突在于：科学能否穿透现象抵达本体？ 按照康德哲学，这个答案是否定的。这直接动摇了科学追求终极真理的合法性。另一方面，遭遇这种对立的诘难，不是我们主观上的意愿所能逃避的。它正是科学研究的深度和广度迫使我们不得不尝试的。

有幸的是，另一位来自德国的哲学家（黑格尔）给出了一个康德哲学“二律背反”的解法。如果对立永恒存在，矛盾不能抵消，那么矛盾本身就是一种极具变革性的力量。

既然还原论和整体论的对立来源于现象和物质的对立。通过矛盾的变革性力量，我们可以做到以下几点：1. 接受不完备。将不可知性转化为探索动力，接受科学模型永远是对现象的近似，但拒绝不可知论的消极性，不执着于追求“终极解释”；2. 划界诊断。在具体问题中划清“可还原”与“需整体”的领域，针对具体研究对象，明确哪些属性可通过底层机制充分解释？哪些属性必须考虑高层级相互作用；3. 边界迭代。通过“边界拓展”逼近更完备模型，主动暴露失效点驱动理论修正，将还原论无法解释的“异常数据”视为整体性作用的信号，而非干扰噪声。

真理不在任一极端，而在对立的张力之中。这样的情况下，对立和矛盾不再具有破坏性，而是一种建设性的力量。

最后我想强调的是对矛盾的探究，绝不可能是由黑格尔哲学的主观想象完成。不可能只要学者转变思维，或具有创新思维就能实现对矛盾的理解。对物质科学的更深入的探究，永远离不开更优良的工具。

上述论述内容建立在我对辩证唯物主义的认识。我看来它仍然不完善，还在不断的学习中。我想这将会是我接下来研究的主要方法。我称呼它为矛盾论的研究方法。

The English Translation (From DeepSeek-R1:0528)

Reductionism depicts a world where all matter can be decomposed into independent, distinct fundamental units. Starting from these units, we can reconstruct the entire world. Holism, however, argues that matter is inherently indivisible and must be considered as a whole. These two perspectives on understanding the world are ancient, yet they only truly emerged as systematic, opposing camps on the intellectual stage roughly within the last century.

Recently, criticism of reductionism within the scientific community has increased. Glancing through several scientific articles, especially those in top-tier journals, reveals this trend. Initially, without much deeper thought, this seemed to me to reflect that our understanding of the material world had reached a bottleneck. The depth and breadth of contemporary scientific research far exceed the sum of the past three hundred years. The number of participants in contemporary science also surpasses the total of the past. Viewing this through Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm shifts,” it seemed science had entered an era requiring revolutionary transformation.

My undergraduate scientific training taught me that “structure determines properties.” To investigate problems at the apparent level, one must delve downwards, reaching the molecular or atomic level to understand the matter itself. However, over the past 6-7 years, my experience in scientific research has followed an opposite path. More often than not, my work involved an Edisonian process – conducting numerous experiments to find the optimal result, and then subsequently piecing together a coherent, microscopic-level theory. The theoretical approach diverged from, or even reversed, the practical implementation path. We were forced to introduce special exceptions for case after case. Simultaneously, theoretical complexity exploded. These exceptions and complex theories inevitably led to the fragmentation between disciplines. The more work we did, the more we analyzed, the more complex the theories became – seemingly bringing us closer to truth, yet paradoxically pushing us further away. I believe almost every contemporary researcher faces this problem. To a large extent, because of this discrepancy, the researcher’s work has transformed into writing fantastical scientific narratives, rather than letting the material, the truth itself, speak.

Does this mean we should pursue a holistic understanding?

After this initial realization, I indeed thought so. But reality shows that without reductionism, matter becomes unresearchable. Although many studies claim to approach problems from a holistic perspective, the actual substance often remains within the old paradigm. In the holistic assumption, if matter is indivisible and must be considered as a whole, the number of parameters we need to consider increases dramatically. If a cell can only be understood within the context of the human body, and the human within the universe, then the consequence is that we must understand the entire universe to understand any specific thing. If, however, we blur some properties of the whole and focus on constituent units, this simply becomes reductionism applied at a macroscopic scale.

More and more reflection suggests this is another impossible world. Both reductionism and holism ultimately aim for the same thing: for humans to become like God, recreating the world. And this is utterly impossible. Humans and science cannot achieve such a goal. We must develop a more fundamental understanding of reductionism and holism.

If reductionism emphasizes that matter can be decomposed into independent, distinct fundamental units, then do such independent, non-interdependent fundamental units exist in our world? I believe anyone could firmly answer: No! So, how do independent fundamental units come about? Take hydrogen bonding, a force crucial to the material world, as an example. Although hydrogen bond research has spanned over a century, each scholar studying different cases proposed their own definition. It wasn’t until 2011 that the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) provided a relatively comprehensive definition of the hydrogen bond. In specific research, we generally consider interactions within a distance of 2.3-3.5 Ångstroms and with angles close to right angles as hydrogen bonds. In even more detailed studies, the criteria become fuzzier, often expanding the acceptable range.

The story of the hydrogen bond reveals the process of defining an independent fundamental unit. First, a scholar notices a potential “unit” (in this case, Linus Pauling played this role). Subsequently, over a long period, numerous scholars working on diverse specific problems attempt to characterize this “unit.” Only after sufficient research, sufficient time, and the investigation of sufficiently varied problems does the scientific community reach a partial consensus and propose a definition. We can see that within this process of establishing an independent fundamental unit lies the shadow of holism. Only by probing enough cases—hydrogen bonds in water, hydrogen bonds in water in different states, hydrogen bonds in different proteins, etc.—can we define a standard fundamental “unit”! From this perspective, the fundamental units recognized by reductionism are essentially macroscopic statistical results, abstractions based on numerous observations of similar phenomena while ignoring extreme cases. More profoundly, they are abstractions of the phenomena we observe.

And holism? Holism emphasizes that matter itself cannot be divided; it cannot be broken down into fundamental units and can only be understood as the whole entity itself. Its argument states that the matter we observe possesses unique characteristics inherent to it as a whole, characteristics that cannot be determined through reductionist methods. Its significance lies in asserting that the matter we study has an existence independent of our observations – an intrinsic essence, the thing-in-itself (noumenon).

Thus, the core of the problem becomes the opposition between the phenomena we abstract and the matter itself. At this point, we can be quite pleased, because in the long history of philosophy, a philosopher from Königsberg (Immanuel Kant) addressed precisely this divide. Kant divided the world into the “phenomenal world” (phenomena) and the “thing-in-itself” (noumena). He proposed that humans can only know phenomena, while the thing-in-itself follows its own laws. The phenomenal world and the noumena are fundamentally opposed; they cannot be placed on the same level of thought. The contradiction between them is irreconcilable, necessitating their separation. This separation led Kant’s philosophy to encounter the problem of “antinomy” – situations where two seemingly contradictory conclusions about the same object or problem are both logically sustainable. This very problem is the core challenge faced by both reductionism and holism. Judging from this, the contradiction between reductionism and holism must inevitably exist eternally; it absolutely cannot be unified. The core of this opposition stems not merely from epistemological differences; it originates from the opposition between Kant’s “phenomena” and “noumena.”

If we accept the opposition between reductionism and holism, can we stop the debate, like Kant, ignoring the contradiction and discussing them only within their respective domains?

The answer is clearly no. If science is the pursuit of truth, and if the “truth” about a specific problem can only speak from one perspective while being utterly inexplicable from the other, then is this “truth” really truth? The fundamental conflict is this: Can science penetrate phenomena to reach the noumenon? According to Kant, the answer is no. This directly challenges the legitimacy of science’s quest for ultimate truth. On the other hand, confronting this contradiction is not something we can evade through subjective will. It is precisely the depth and breadth of scientific research that compels us to attempt it.

Fortunately, another philosopher from Germany (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) offered a solution to Kant’s “antinomy.” If opposition exists eternally and contradiction cannot be negated, then contradiction itself becomes a profoundly transformative force. Since the opposition between reductionism and holism stems from the opposition between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, we can harness the transformative power of contradiction to achieve the following:

Accept Incompleteness: Transform unknowability into a driving force for exploration. Accept that scientific models are always approximations of phenomena but reject the passivity of agnosticism. Do not obsess over seeking the “ultimate explanation.”

Define Boundaries and Diagnose: Delineate the realms of “what can be reduced” and “what requires a holistic view” for specific problems. Clarify, for a specific research object, which properties can be adequately explained by underlying mechanisms, and which properties require consideration of higher-level interactions.

Iterate Boundaries: Use “boundary expansion” to approach more complete models. Actively expose points of failure to drive theoretical refinement. Treat “anomalous data” inexplicable by reductionism as signals of holistic effects, not merely noise.

Truth resides not in either extreme, but within the tension of opposites. In this state, opposition and contradiction cease to be destructive forces; they become constructive. Finally, I must emphasize that the exploration of contradictions absolutely cannot be achieved solely through Hegelian subjective imagination or simply by scholars shifting their mindset or possessing innovative thinking. Deeper investigation into material science will forever require superior tools.

The above discussion is based on my understanding of dialectical materialism. I find it still incomplete and remain in a constant state of learning. I believe this will be the primary methodology for my future research. I call it the contradiction-based methodology.

The essay also has been published on substack https://clidx.substack.com/p/from-the-opposition-between-reductionism?r=6dn7g0